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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Utah Supreme Court had initial jurisdiction under U.C.A. §78A-3-
102(3)(j). The case was transferred to this court under Rule 42(a), Utah R. App. P., and 
U.C.A. §78A-3-102(4). This court has jurisdiction under U.C.A. §78A-4-103(2)(j). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
Issue No, One 
Did the trial court commit error in granting partitionment (sale of property) 
in equal shares without an accounting or equitable compensatory adjustments. 
Standard of Review 
In equity cases the standard of review is one of correctness. RHN Corp. v. 
VeibeU, 2004 UT 60,1122, 96 P.3d 935. Deference should be granted to factual findings. 
The reviewing court should not reverse unless findings are clearly erroneous. Id. 1122. 
The equitable distribution of property also requires a discretionary 
balancing of the facts and the law to achieve a fair and equitable result. Parduhn v. 
Bennett, 2005 UT 22,1123,112 P.3d 495. There is broad discretion at the trial court level 
to fashion appropriate decrees. Gillmor v. Gillmor. 657 P.2d 736, 739 (Utah 1982). 
Affirmation on appeal is required unless that discretion is abused. Id. 739. See also 
United Park v. Stichting Mayflower. 2006 UT 35, 140 P.3d 1200. 
Issue Preserved in Trial Cour{ 
Jepsen (Defendant/Appellant) raised contract, waiver and estoppel theories 
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in his answer and counterclaim, R. 14-10, and developed those arguments in his 
objections, R. 163-150, to Wither's motion for summary judgment. Jepsen expanded his 
theories in the objections to include restitution, R. 151, and partnership, joint venture, and 
constructive and resulting trusts. R. 153-152. Those theories and the facts of the case 
essentially produce the same result as equitable balancing in partitionment, the remedy 
adopted by the trial court. 
Issue No, 2 
Did the trial court err in concluding that Jepsen failed to raise a genuine 
issue of material fact in opposing Wither's motion for summary judgment. 
Standard of Review 
In deciding whether summary judgment is appropriate, the appellate court 
need review only whether the trial court erred in applying the relevant law and whether a 
material fact was in dispute. Snyder v. Murray City Corp., 2003 UT 13,1116, 73 P.3d 325. 
The appellate court applies the same standard as that applied by the trial court; 
accordingly, the appellate court reviews the trial court's decision for correctness. 
Brighton Corp. Ward, 2001 UT App. 236,1113, 31 P.3d 594. The legal conclusions of the 
trial court are reviewed for correctness, including conclusions that material facts are not 
disputed. Kunz & Co. v. State, 913 P.2d 765, 768 (Utah App. 1996). Facts are liberally 
construed in favor of the party opposing summary judgment and that party is given the 
benefit of all inferences reasonably drawn from the evidence. No deference is given the 
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conclusions of the trial court. Clover v. Snowbird Ski Resort 808 P.2d 1037,1039 (Utah 
1991). 
Issue Preserved in Trial Court 
Jepsen argued the facts at length in his objections, R. 160-155, and 
summarized the issues in a recapitulation. R. 152-151. 
DETERMINATIVE LAW 
A joint owner is entitled to an accounting as a matter of right in a partition 
action. Barrett v. Vickers, 362 P.2d 586 (Utah 1961), and compensatory adjustment in 
equity should govern the ultimate distributions to the parties under U.C.A. §78B-6-1241. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Withers sued Jepsen for partitionment or sale of a six acre parcel of real 
property located in Boulder, Garfield County, Utah. Jepsen answered on grounds that 
Withers was entitled to nothing because she had breached her agreement to reside with 
him as his wife. Jepsen asserted waiver and estoppel as additional defenses. Jepsen's 
filing included a counterclaim generally on those same grounds. He asked the trial court 
for a decree quieting title to the real property, included claims for damages. 
Following discovery Withers filed a motion for summary judgment arguing 
that partition of the land itself was inappropriate and that the court should order the land 
sold. Jepsen opposed the motion with several theories sounding in equity and contract, 
and made a showing in his view that issues of fact barred summary judgment. 
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The court ruled on the motion by written memorandum decision dated 
October 24, 2008. The court failed to find an issue of material fact and held that Withers 
was entitled to judgment as a matter of law. The trial court concluded that the parties 
owned the real property in equal shares. Withers specifically sought relief in her petition 
under the partitionment statutes, then found at U.C.A. §78-39-1, et seq., and the court 
cited those statutory provisions in granting relief. However, no accounting was ordered 
and the court was silent on anything in the nature of equalization or compensatory 
adjustment.1 
RELEVANT FACTS 
With few exceptions the facts of this case were acknowledged by both 
parties. They are detailed in part in Wither's affidavit, R. 126-124, and in her 
memorandum in support of motion for summary judgment. R. 123-118. Jepsen supplied 
additional facts in his objections to the motion, R. 163-150, and Withers stated in her 
reply memorandum that they "are not in dispute." R. 190. 
The parties were married in 1994, and divorced in 1998. No children were 
born as issue of the marriage. They purchased a modular home and moved it onto a 
parcel of real property which was given to Jepsen by his parents. The property is located 
in Boulder, Utah. The elderly Jepsens reside nearby. The modular home had been owned 
xThe partition statutes are now found at U.C.A. §78B-6-1201 et seq., Laws 2008, 
c. 3, §1023, eff. Feb. 7, 2008. 
4 
by a certain Gibbons. The parties rented the modular home when it was located on the 
Gibbons land, and moved it to the Jepsen property after buying the structure from 
Gibbons. R. 163-162. 
Occupancy of the home on the Jepsen property started May, 1996. After 
the divorce in 1998, Withers moved to Cedar City and lived there for approximately one 
year. The parties then reconciled and ended up back in Boulder in the modular home. In 
June, 2001, the parties borrowed $70,000 and mortgaged the home and land as collateral. 
R-162. They held themselves out as married in the loan application. R. 132. The 
mortgage funds were used for property improvements and living expenses. R. 162. 
The parties separated for good in the year 2002 and later learned that the 
initial conveyance from Jepsen's parents described the wrong parcel. That mistake was 
rectified by an exchange of deeds. Withers bases her claim on the correction deed. R. 
162. 
The record title to the real property is vested in the parties jointly. R. 162. 
It is a six acre parcel with greenbelt zoning. Neither party had it appraised for the case. 
R. 161. Withers testified that the modular home and the land had a combined value of 
$175,000 before improvements, making reference to an earlier but unknown appraisal. 
R. 125. However, the divorce proceedings between the parties in 1998 gave the property 
in full to Jepsen with a modest $5,000 cash award to Withers. R. 130. Jepsen valued the 
property at $80,000 when he was deposed on May 5, 2005. R. 155. 
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In July, 2002, two months after the final separation of the parties. Jepsen's 
parents approached Withers with a request that she reconvey to them the parcel 
mistakenly described in the initial conveyancing. The request was not anticipated. 
Withers declined to sign a deed at that time explaining that she would need to seek legal 
advice. R. 159-158. 
Withers later exchanged deeds with the Jepsen parents after each side had 
the benefit of counsel. The exchange of deeds, in the mind of Withers, did not make a 
new contract. It merely corrected what had been an earlier mistake. R. 158. The 
correction deed from the parents vested title in Withers and Jepsen the way they intended 
at the outset. R. 158-157. 
Withers testified about money claims during her deposition. During the 
post-decree period of cohabitation, Withers claimed that she contributed the following for 
the common good of the parties, R.157: 
Item Amount 
Mortgage Payments $15,290.00 
Payments to/for defendant 2,441.00 
Home and vehicle insurance 1,978.58 
Range and washer 873.90 
The land at issue was initially given to Jepsen by his parents. It was not a 
joint gift to Jepsen and Withers. Jepsen was employed by his parents doing ranch work, 
and he had 30 head of cattle of his own. The parents sold their ranch but Jepsen retained 
his cattle and runs them on other property leased from the parents. R. 156. 
Jepsen also had income from work in construction. Jepsen borrowed 
between $15,000 and $20,000 from his parents for the site work on the land. The $70,000 
mortgage loan was used to retire the debt to Gibbons for the modular home, and for the 
land and home improvements. R. 156. The lender was National City Mortgage Co. The 
security instrument was a standard deed of trust. R. 146. 
Jepsen claimed that he and Withers entered into a contract when they 
reconciled after the divorce to jointly finance the home improvements with the new 
mortgage and stay together and jointly retire that obligation. R. 156. However, the 
promise was broken when Withers breached the contract by having an affair with a 
certain Jeff Hansen, thus precipitating the separation and the end of their relationship. R. 
156. Withers admitted her infidelity and professed love for her paramour. R. 155. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The court granted the petition to sell the land (neither party argued for 
actual partition), but did not adjust the equities. That produced a windfall for Withers in 
contravention of the need for equalization under U.C.A. §78B-6-1241. 
All of the facts advanced by Jepsen were acknowledged by Withers. She 
characterized the critical facts (the agreement to live together and jointly retire the 
mortgage obligation) as either conclusions or facts immaterial to the action. R. 189. The 
court adopted Wither's argument, agreeing that those statements were conclusions and 
not facts. Jepsen contends otherwise, insisting that the trier of fact must resolve those 
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claims. 
Jepsen argued breach of contract and estoppel and several related theories 
in opposing Wither's claim for half of the land, R. 137-140, but he did not specifically 
call upon the court to "balance the equities" under U.C.A.§78B-6-1241. The facts and 
the law to warrant an accounting, and then equitable adjustments, were posited front and 
center for the court to consider, but that remedy was overlooked. The omission was plain 
error. 
DETAIL OF THE ARGUMENT 
Partition 
The division of real property is difficult at best. Any given parcel of 
property is almost always unique. Parcels with improvements raise additional 
complexities. The Utah statutes on partition provide useful tools to address these 
problems. It is equity at its best. The primary statute is U.C.A. §78B-6-1241. It is a 
revision of its predecessor, U.C.A. §78-39-41. Owelty can be awarded, and 
compensatory adjustments can be made among the parties on equitable principles. That is 
what should have happened in this case. However, when equitable adjustments are 
needed, an accounting must be had to put the facts and figures on the table. Barrett v. 
Vickers, 362 P.2d 586, 588 (Utah 1961). 
The court had a good summary of the facts. The history of the parties and 
their financial dealings were revealed. There was no secret about a valuable parcel of real 
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property being gifted to Jepsen by his parents, and his generosity in turn with Withers. 
She was awarded $5,000 the first time around and now wants many times that figure. If 
the parties had married a second time, a second decree would likely have tracked the first. 
Withers should not be rewarded on the happenstance that there was no marriage 
ceremony. Equity should intervene and that was the error of the court. 
The equitable distribution of property, however, involves more than factual 
findings and legal conclusions. It requires trial courts to balance "the relative 
significance of the facts and applicable law in order to achieve a fair and equitable result. 
This balancing requires the exercise of discretion." Parduhn v. Bennett, 2005 UT 22, H23, 
112 P.3d 495. In partition actions, trial courts are specifically "accorded broad discretion 
in fashioning an appropriate decree." Gillmor v. Gillmor, 657 P.2d 736, 739 (Utah 1982). 
There is nothing in the partition statutes which calls for a clinical division 
of land on a strictly 50/50 basis simply because the record title is jointly vested in the 
owners. It would be a rare case, indeed, where that remedy would be appropriate. Liens 
and encumbrances must be addressed. Referees can be appointed as arms of the court to 
investigate and make recommendations. The court has discretion to confirm, change, and 
modify their reports. Adverse claims and interests of tenants have to be considered. A 
rote division based solely on the status of record title is at odds with the mandate of the 
partition statutes. 
In this case the court had the whole story, and the equities were decidedly in 
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favor of Jepsen. The court had the history of the initial marriage and the property and 
debt division when that ended. The contributions by the parties during their reunion of 
1999 through 2002 were before the court. Indeed, Withers itemized hers to the penny. 
There was little if anything to suggest that her interest in the land should have been 
greater than the cash award in the decree previously entered. Jepsen has suffered 
substantial harm, whether the property is valued in excess of $175,000 as Withers stated 
or at Jepsen's lower figure of $80,000. 
Oral argument on the motion for a summary judgment was held on October 
16, 2008. R. 195. The court issued a memorandum decision dated October 24, 2008. 
R. 205. The ruling granted Wither's motion, leaving the parties in equal ownership with 
no adjustment for the many equities which were fairly presented in the evidence. The 
memorandum decision was implemented by an order dated January 16, 2009. R. 231-
239. The court had sufficient facts to fashion a remedy under the partition statutes to 
compensate Withers for her three year romance with Jepsen without penalizing him with 
the loss of half the land. 
Issues of Facts 
A single sworn statement is sufficient to create an issue of fact precluding 
summary judgment. Webster v. Sill, 675 P.2d 1170,1172, (Utah 1983). Facts and 
inferences from those facts should be construed in favor of the opponent of the motion. 
Norton v. Blackham, 669 P.2d 857, 859, (Utah 1983). Jepsen and Withers were married 
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for four years. Jepsen acquired the six acres during that time. The land was awarded to 
Jepsen when the parties divorced in 1988. Wither's was given a $5,000 property 
settlement. Their subsequent reconciliation lead to site and home improvements and a 
$70,000 mortgage to National City. The "new marriage" was short-lived. Withers 
walked out with another man, a fact she doesn't deny, and now wants half the land which 
she values at greater than $175,000. 
The debate about genuine issues of material fact focuses on paragraphs 25 
and 26 in Jepsen's objections to the motion. R. 136. The paragraphs are selections from 
Jepsen's deposition: 
[Jepsen] and Withers entered into a contract after the divorce to 
jointly finance the home improvements with the new mortgage 
and that they would stay together and jointly retire that obligation. 
Withers breached her contract with Jepsen by having an affair 
with Jeff Hansen, thus precipitating the separation and the end 
of their relationship. 
Withers argued without authority that those statements were "mere 
allegations and argument" and not statements of fact. R. 186. The court sided with 
Withers and characterized the Jepsen statements as "legal conclusions" from a deposition 
which was not admissible into evidence. The court also faulted the statements on grounds 
that they were not made on personal knowledge. R. 201. 
The fact that the Jepsen statements are lifts from his deposition does not 
render them inadmissible. Beltran v. Allan. 926 P.2d 892, 894 (Utah App. 1996). We are 
then left with whether the statements are indeed statements of fact or mere conclusions. 
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The parties did resume connubial relations. The modular home was purchased and 
remodeled. Site work on the land was completed. Each borrowed funds from relatives to 
do so. They jointly mortgaged the property to National City to raise loan proceeds of 
$70,000. Withers acknowledges that she had the affair and left. What Jepsen said about 
that story fits like hand in glove. He asserted that they jointly agreed to finance the home 
and live together and retire that obligation. That is as factual as it gets. 
Contract principles can provide appropriate remedies to unravel the affairs 
of couples who adopt all the ways of a marriage except the ceremony. Edgar v. Edgar, 
572 P.2d 405 (Utah 1977). This jurisdiction has also recognized partnership and trust 
theories as effective tools to equitably distribute property accumulated by unmarried 
cohabitants. Layton v. Layton. 777 P.2d 504, 505-506 (Utah App. 1989). 
The Jepsen statement is specific as to the making of a contract. The object 
of the contract is identified (jointly finance improvements, stay together). The ultimate 
goal is stated (retire mortgage obligation). Those assertions are sufficient to establish a 
specific set of elements essential to Jepsen's contract theory. Anderson Development Co. 
v. Tobias, 2005 UT 36, H23, 116 P.3d 323. The facts advanced by Jepsen would also 
probe his other theories. 
The second statement by Jepsen is more specific, and not really disputed. 
He says that Withers had an affair with Jeff Hansen, ending their relationship. Withers 
admitted as much, and Jepsen called that a breach of their agreement. Again, those are 
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pointed facts. The court had sufficient evidence to bar summary judgment and allow 
Jepsen his day in court on his contract and estoppel theories. 
CONCLUSION 
Jepsen identified material issues of fact justifying trial on any of the several 
theories which he raised. Even if relief was appropriate only under the partition statutes, 
that relief should have included equitable adjustments to achieve fairness for each of the 
parties. The court knew it was making a decree of partitionment and cited the correct 
statutory provisions. However, the core principles of equity necessary to make those 
statutes do their job were bypassed. The case should be remanded to the trial court for 
trial on the merits or for a partition decree which balances the equities between the 
parties. 
DATED this y of April, 2010. 
MARCUS TAYI 
ATTORNEY FORTOFENDANT 
SERVICE CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that on the day of April, 2010,1 served two copies of the 
foregoing Brief of the Appellant via first class mail on Dennis C. Ferguson, Attorney at Law, 
257 East 200 South, #500, P. O. Box 45678, Salt Lake City, Utah 84145. 
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DISTRICT COURT, STATE OF UTAH 
COUNTY OF GARFIELD 
55 South Main Street 
Panguitch, Utah 84759 
Telephone: (435) 676-8826; Facsimile: (435) 676-8239 
TREENA A. WITHERS, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
MARC J. JEPSON, 
Defendant. 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
Case No. 040600027 
Assigned Judge: Wallace A. Lee 
This case is before the Court for decision on two pending motions: (1) the defendant's 
Motion to Amend Answer and Counterclaim; and (2) the plaintiffs Motion for Summary 
Judgment. 
The Motion for Summary Judgment has been briefed, and a hearing was held on 16 
October 2008. The Motion to Amend Answer and Counterclaim was filed 31 August 2006. The 
plaintiff failed to respond, but the defendant failed to submit the motion for decision until oral 
argument on the plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment. The motions are now ripe for 
decision. 
DECISION 
The defendant's Motion to Amend Answer and Counterclaim should be denied. The 
PIT 7ZT1 plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment should be granted. 
Hi 
t>J\ 
Of L 
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ANALYSIS 
1. Motion to Amend Answer and Counterclaim: 
Rule 15(a), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides that after responsive pleadings 
have been served, "a party may amend his pleading only by leave of court...; and leave shall 
freely be given when justice so requires." 
When considering whether justice requires an amendment, the Court looks at several 
factors: (1) the timeliness of the motion; (2) the justification for delay; and (3) any resulting 
prejudice to the responding party. Atcitty v. Board of Education, 967 P.2d 1261, 1264 (Utah 
App. 1998), citing Swift Stop, Inc. v. Wight, 845 P.2d 250, 253 (Utah App. 1992); see also 
Westley v. Farmer's Ins. Exch., 663 P.2d 93, 94 (Utah 1983). 
In this case, the Motion to Amend Answer and Counterclaim was filed on 31 August 
2006, more than a year after the discovery deadline, and more than a month after the plaintiff 
filed her Motion for Summary Judgment. There appears to be little justification for the delay 
because the Court concludes the defendant was aware or should have been aware of the additional 
theories he proposes to add to the Answer and Counterclaim long before his Motion was filed. 
Similarly, the Court notes it was the defendant's responsibility, under Rule 7(d), Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure, to submit a motion to the Court for decision. Indeed, Rule 7(d) 
specifies that "if no party files a request [to submit for decision], the motion will not be submitted 
WITHERS V. JEPSON, Case No. 040600027 
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for decision." The motion in this case was filed 31 August 2006, but the defendant failed to 
submit it for decision for more than two years. The Court finds the motion is untimely and there 
was simply no justification for the delay in this case. 
Finally, the Court find great prejudice would result to the responding party because this 
motion was first brought to the attention of the Court during oral argument on the plaintiffs 
Motion for Summary Judgment, after the plaintiffs motion had been fully briefed by the parties 
and argument had occurred. 
On this basis, the Court concludes the defendant's Motion to Amend Answer and 
Counterclaim should be denied. 
2. Motion for Summary Judgment: 
Summary judgment is appropriate when "there is no issue as to any material fact and ... 
the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, 
Rule 56(c). There is no genuine issue as to any material fact when "on the basis of the facts in the 
record, reasonable minds could [not] differ" in the conclusion. Sanns v. Butterfield Ford, 94 P.3d 
301, 304 (Utah App. 2004), citing Jackson v. Dabney, 645 P.2d 613, 615 (Utah 1982). 
In this case, the plaintiff lists six (6) undisputed facts. The plaintiffs set of undisputed 
facts are as follows: 
1. The parties are joint tenants of the real property at issue. 
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2. The real property consists of a house situated on six (6) acres of land. 
3. There is a mortgage on the home and real property in the approximate amount of 
$65,000.00. 
4. The house and real property were appraised for $175,000.00 in 2001, prior to 
improvements. 
5. The house and real property are located within Boulder Town. 
6. The property is zoned green belt multiple use. 
The plaintiff filed an affidavit in support of her Motion for Summary Judgment. 
When a motion for summary judgment is made and supported by affidavit as in this case, 
the adverse party "may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of the pleadings, but the 
response, by affidavits or as otherwise provided in this rule, must set forth specific facts showing 
that there is a genuine issue for trial." Rule 56(e), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
In this case, the defendant responded to the plaintiff's motion and affidavit in a document 
entitled Objections by Defendant to Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment. The defendant did 
not support his objection with an opposing affidavit. Instead he refers to the pleadings and 
discovery materials in the case as permitted under Rule 56(e). 
The defendant's objection does not dispute the plaintiffs statement of undisputed fact, but 
attempts to raises a genuine issue of material fact in a series of 28 numbered paragraphs entitled 
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"other important facts" which essentially assert the following: 
A. The plaintiff and defendant were married in 1994, and divorced in 1998. 
B. The defendant was awarded a modular home in the divorce. The plaintiff was awarded 
$5,000.00 cash as a "property settlement." 
C. The plaintiff and defendant reconciled, moved back to Boulder and began living 
together again in 1999. 
D. The parties held themselves out as being husband and wife, but never remarried. 
E. In 2001, the defendant's parents gave him the parcel of real property at issue in this 
case. The defendant then conveyed the property to himself and the plaintiff as joint tenants. 
F. The parties lived together in the modular home they affixed to the real property. 
G. The parties used the real property as collateral for a loan. 
H. The parties used the money from the loan, along with their own funds and funds 
acquired from their parents to improve the property. 
I. The plaintiff contributed money for the common good of the parties including mortgage 
payments, payments to or for the defendant, home and vehicle insurance and range and washer. 
J. The parties separated in May, 2002, after the plaintiff left the defendant for another 
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man. 
K. Later in 2002, the parties learned the quitclaim deed by which they acquired title to the 
real property as joint tenants contained an incorrect legal description. 
L. The incorrect legal description was later cured by exchange of correction deeds 
between the parties and the defendant's parents. 
The Court also learned at oral argument that neither party currently resides in the home on 
the subject property. 
The plaintiff does not dispute any of these facts, and in her reply memorandum, refers to 
them as "mere background facts." The Court agrees and finds none of these facts sufficient to 
raise a genuine issue of material fact concerning the defendant's claims of an oral contract, part 
performance, promises as to future conduct or a constructive trust. 
Indeed, the Court finds only two of the numbered paragraphs (paragraphs 25 and 26) in 
the defendant's statement of "other important facts, " actually support the defendant's claims, and 
these paragraphs contain only the defendant's legal conclusions, unsubstantiated opinions, 
conjecture, and belief. 
For example, Paragraph 25 states "Jepson claims that he and Withers entered into a 
contract after the divorce to jointly finance the home improvements with the new mortgage and 
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that they would stay together and jointly retire that obligation. Jepson deposition, page 21,22." 
Similarly, Paragraph 26 states "Withers breached her contract with Jepsen by having an 
affair with Jeff Hansen, thus precipitating the separation and the end of their relationship. Jepson 
deposition, page 22-25. 
It is a fundamental principle of Utah law that "[a]n affidavit in opposition to a motion for 
summary judgment must set forth facts that would be admissible in evidence." Norton v. 
Blackham, 669 P.2d 857, 859 (Utah 1983). Legal conclusions offered by a party in a deposition 
simply are not admissible in evidence. 
Indeed, "[ajffidavits submitted in support or in opposition to a motion for summary 
judgment must be based on the personal knowledge of the affiant and may not be considered by 
the trial court if largely based on unsubstantiated opinions, conjecture, and beliefs." Brown v. 
Jorgensen, 136 P.3d 1252 (Utah App. 2006). 
Finally, the defendant also argues the plaintiff effectively waived her right to partition the 
property when she allegedly admitted in her deposition that the relief she really wants is limited to 
monetary damages. 
However, to support such a conclusion, the defendant offers only one statement 
(Paragraph 17) in his statement of "other important facts." That statement is likewise conclusory, 
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and the Court finds the defendant's conclusion is not accurate. 
In Paragraph 17, the defendant quotes a portion of the plaintiffs deposition in which she 
was asked "[t]he amounts that you claim that you have paid for the house and other things are all 
payments since the divorce was over and you reconciled and got back together?" The plaintiff 
simply responded "[y]es." 
The question and response is not sufficient to create a genuine issue of material fact about 
whether the plaintiff waived her right to partition. 
The major purpose of summary judgment is "to avoid unnecessary trial by allowing the 
parties to pierce the pleadings to determine whether there is a genuine issue to present to the fact 
finder." Brown v. Jorgensen, 136 P.3d 1252, 1258 (Utah App. 2006). Therefore, "specific facts 
are required to show whether there is a genuine issue for trial." Id. 
After careful consideration, the Court concludes the defendant has failed to set forth 
specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. Therefore, with regard to the 
plaintiffs claim that she is entitled to partition and sale of the Boulder property, the Court finds 
no genuine issue of material fact. The Court finds the parties each own an undivided half interest 
in the property as Joint Tenants. 
Likewise, the Court finds the plaintiff entitled to judgment as a matter of law. The right to 
partition has been properly invoked in this case under Utah Code Annotated 78-39-1 et seq. 
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Under such circumstances, the Utah Supreme Court, in Barrett v. Vickers, 362 P.2d. 586 (Utah 
1961) held that "[i]t is obvious that where a cotenancy is undesirable to one or more of the parties 
and they cannot agree upon a solution to the problems it presents, there must be some method of 
terminating it. To meet such exigencies our statutes provide that when an action is brought the 
court 'must order a partition according to the respective rights of the parties,' or alternatively that 
upon proof'to the satisfaction of the court, that * * * the partition cannot be made without great 
prejudice to the owners, the court may order a sale thereof" Id. at 587; see also, Arthur v. 
Chournos, 574 P.2d 723, 724 (Utah 1978). 
Indeed, in Barrett, the Supreme Court noted that "[a] co-tenant who has properly invoked 
the aid of this statute is entitled to one or the other of these remedies [partition or sale] as a 
matter of right. The failure of the trial court to grant either was error . . . . " Id. 
In this case the Court agrees with the plaintiff that due to zoning restraints, the property 
cannot be legally or equitably divided. Therefore, the Court finds that partition cannot be made 
without great prejudice to the owners. 
Accordingly, the Motion for Partial Summary Judgment regarding partition and sale of the 
real property in this case should be granted. 
CONCLUSION 
The defendant's Motion to Amend Answer and Counterclaim is denied. The plaintiffs 
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Motion for Summary Judgment is granted. Counsel for the plaintiff is ordered to draft an 
appropriate order to implement this decision. 
DATED this l24th 1 day of [October L 2008. 
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